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We present a quarterly macroeconomic model of South Korea that explicitly incorporates
stylized facts about Korea's financial structure (absence of primary securities markets, existence
of a curbmarket for credit, etc.). The model focuses on the linkage between financial and real
sectors and explicitly incorporates the transmission channel of monetary policy into the supply
side of the economy via the real costs of working capital ('Cavallo-effect'). The econornetric
evidence presented here shows the relevance of this effect. Simulation runs with the model based
on the estimated parameter \alues show strong stagflationary effects of restrictive monetary
policy in the short run because of this transmission channel.
1. Introduction
There exists a small but growing body of evidence that the use of some
macroeconomic policy instruments (exchange rates, money supply) in LDCs
has effects that differ from what one would expect given the predictions of
the standard 'North-Atlantic' macro-models. Contractionary effects of a
devaluation is a subject with a long history of course, but more recently
several authors have started to point to perverse effects of monetary restraint
on inflation in LDCs: inflation has often accelerated rather than slowed
down as a short-run response on restrictive monetary policy. Empirical
evidence is still mainly anecdotical and is to a large extent based on the
experience with IMF style stabilization attempts in Latin America. Starting
with Cavallo (1977), attempts at solving the puzzle have generally considered
the structure of the financial system as the key to the explanation of the
*This paper is based on part of my Ph.D. dissertation at M.I.T. (1980). 1 would like to thank
my thesis advisors Lance Taylor and Stanley Fischer for helpful discussions. I am further
indebted to participants at a seminar at the Korea Development Institute, Seoul, and an
unknown referee for their perceptive comments. Financial assistance of the Niels Steiisen
lFoundation and the Common Wealth Fund via a Harkness Fellowslhip is gratefully
acknowledged. Views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of
the World Bank.
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stagflationary effects of restrictive monetary policy measures. [In addition to
Cavallo (1977), see BruIno (1979), van Wijnbergen (1979a), or Taylor (1980).]
In a relatively underdeveloped system of financial intermediation, stock
markets play a limited role, if any at all. Accordingly, banks play a much
more predominant role than they do in Europe or the United States as a
source of funds for firms, both for short-term working capital purposes and
for long-term fixed capital formation. For example, debt/equity ratios in
countries like Korea range from 5 or 6 to 1 upwards as opposed to 1 or 2 to
1 in the United States or Western Europe. The high leverage, plus the fact
that working capital is nearly entirely financed via credit makes the business
sector in LDCs very vulnerable to adverse credit conditions.
Bank credit is often severely rationed, with bank lending rates
unresponsive to excess demand for credit. This is, of course, one of the main
reasons why 'curb markets', Unorganized Money Markets, play such a large
role in many countries. Via these markets the public can lend directly to
firms, bypassing the banking system. Consumer credit is virtually absent,
both in bank loan portfolios and, if Korea is a reliable guide, in the curb
market. The last point implies that, to the extent that tight money policies
affect (real) aggregate demand at all, they do so by curbing investment rather
than consumption.
Much more important in the short run, however, is the transr,,,ission
channel between monetary instruments and the supply side of the economy
via credit financing of working capital needs. Working capital is needed to
finance stocks of raw materials, semi-finished goods, intermediate imports,
advance payments to workers, etc. Typically working capital needs are
financed by bank or curb market credit. This in turn implies that the cost of
credit (the real interest rate) is a component of input costs. Mark up pricing
rules will therefore lead to an immediate cost push effect of high interest
rates (the curb market rate is usually the relevant rate to look at) on prices.
Also, uinder monopolistic market structures, a high cost of credit will not
only lead to a short-run cost push effect on prices, but lead to a reduction in
real output as real input costs have gone up.
This transmission channel, from tight limits on bank credit via the curb
market and high costs of financing working capital into the supply side of
the economy gives a stagflationary bias to tight monetary policies. Basically,
what is going on is that this transmission channel adds an adverse-supply-
shock aspect to policies of monetary restraint on top of the more traditional
demand reducing effects. Tight money policies lead to expensive credit, which
leads to an increase in a component of input costs; this in turn leads to more
inflation and less output than would obtain without this transmission
mechanism present. Tight money policies pushes firms into the curb market,
drives up interest rates there, and so initiates the stagflatioiary effects
mentioned above.
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Nearly all bank credit, and certainly all curb market credit, has a very
short maturity; a Korean curb market loan typically extends over one or two
months. This implies that the stagflationary impact of a credit crunch via the
credit-working capital link will work itself through the system quickly, say
within one or two quarters. The demand restraining impact, however,
typically works only gradually: first aggregate demand (investment) will fall,
which over time, will increase unemployment; this in turn will after further
lags ease real wage pressure and thus inflation. A typical response to a one
shot tightening up of monetary policy would, therefore, be an initial
acceleration of the inflation rate, after which demand effects take over,
effecting a slow down of the rate. Both effects have a negative impact on
output.
Existing macro-models have not incorporated this link between the
financial sector and the supply side of the economy via the financing of
working capital. The purpose of this paper is to do that, to construct a
macro-model that incorporates the financial structure and pricing behavior I
just discussed. This model should help in assessing the empirical relevance of
these issues.
I have chosen South Korea as the testing ground for this exercise mainly
because Korea has come close to conducting a laboratory experiment on this
problem over the past 25 years: credit policies with respect to exporters and
non-exporters have been markedly different. Exporters have essentially
unlimited access to bank credit at subsidized rates, while non-exporters face
higher rates and quantity constraints. Accordingly, non-exporters actively
borrow in the Unorganized Money Market, something for which exporters
have no incentive.
The model, which we present in the next two sections, has a variety of
unusual features An explicit attempt is made to incorporate the financial
structure typical for Korea, and we think, for many other LDCs. The role of
the commercial banking system providing intermediation between private
wealth holders and firms in search for funds, the role of foreign capital
inflows (determined endogenously in this model), the important place of the
Unorganized Money Markets in the Korean financial system, and the use of
credit obtained from those sources and abroad to finance fixed and working
capital are all highlighted. The latter link between monetary conditions and
the financing of working capital provides a transmission mcchanism between
monetary policy and the supply side of the economy, of crucial importance in
many LDCs, but nevertheless usually ignored. Other features are
incorporation of intermediate imports as a factor of production and of the
implicatioris this has for exchange rate policy. All this is done while imposing
the budget and balance sheet constraints faced by the different actors in the
economy, thus insuring consistency between the national accounts, flow of
funds and end of period asset stocks and composition on the one hand, and
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between those and the beginning of period asset stocks on the other. Section
2 focuses on the real sector part of the model; section 3 discusses the
financial sector. In section 4 different monetary stabilization packages are
simulated using the model presented in sections 2 and 3, and alternative
policy measures are discussed; the simulation runs show strong short-run
stagflationary effects of tight money policies. Section 5 offers some
conclusions.
2. A macro model for Korea
2.1. The real sector
The basic structure of tne real sector model is as follows. On the supply
side, we distinguish between two sectors, exporters and non-exporters. The
distinction is made mainly because the goverment (and the government
controlled banking system) follows radically different credit policies with
respect to these two sectors. Exporters have basically unlimited access to
bank credit at subsidized rates, while non-exporters face higher rates and
quantity constraints. The .xport sector is characterized by monopolistic
competition so that firms determine their output and prices simultaneously
subject to a downward sloping (foreign) demand curve, input prices and
production technology. The domestic sector, which has a much lower degree
of concentration as far as firm size is concerned, is assumed to price its
products following a simple mark up rule and also faces a downward sloping
demand curve (for the market as a whole), describing Korean allocation of
their total expenditure over domestic and foreign goods. The output and
pricing decisions are based on a model of the firm that starts from the
assumption that primary costs (wages and costs of intermediate imports) are
financed via credit. The interest rates that are relevant for the cost of credit
are not exogenous. The UMM rate will be discussed in section 3. This
production model is also behind the intermediate imports demand equation.
The wage price sector is completed by an expectations augmented Phillips
curve type relation allowing for catch up wage inflation as a result of last
periods inflation surprises.
2.2. The model equations
In this section we will present the specific equations of the model; for
conciseness of presentation we will also give tne corresponding empirical
results here rather than collecting them in a separate section.
2.2.1. The export section
Assume an exporter faces a downward sloping demand curve describing
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forcign demand for Korean goods:
E-=f (PCX/Pf, Yf), (1)
where PCX is Won price of Korean LXports, E is Korean exports (in real
terms), Pf is Won price of foreign goods with whlich Korean exporters
compete, and Y. is real foreign income. Foreign real income and prices are
weighted geometric averages of the relevant Japanese and U.S. variables;
these two countries received 55.6%' of all Korean exports in the base year of
all our price indices, 1975, while the third largest recipient was West
Germany with less than 5" (in 1975). So approximating trade weighted
'world income' by a weighted average of U.S. and Japanese real income
seems reasonable. The weights are 1975 export shares, rescaled to add up to
one. The foreign price variable, similarly derived, is based on the Japanese
and U.S. WPI. Grossman's conclusion that LDC exports mainly compete
with domestic producers in the importing countries provides some support
for this choice' as does the classic Houthakker-Magee paper on import
demand functions [Grossman (1980), Houthakker-Magee (1969)].
After some experimentation with unrestrained lags, we finally opted for a
Koyck-lag to get the following result:2
lnE=-2.07-0.43In ±+0.17ln(Y*)+0.93In(E(- 1)), (2)
Pf( -1)f
(2.74) (2.35) (1.17) (3.37)
(0.99) (0.98) (0.75) (1.00)
R2 =0.99, estimation period: 66-II/79-IV.
The estimates confirm the familiar high (world-) income elasticity of
Korean exports, the estimates imply a long-run elasticity of slightly below
2.6. They also show a high elasticity with respect to relative prices: a short-
run elasticity of 0.43 builds up to not less than 6.1 in the long run. With the
strong response of Korean exports to the devaluations in 74 and 80 in mind,
this will not come as a surprise either. Let us now turn to export prices.
Consider a firm maximizing its profits subject to (1) and a production
'A caveat is in order here: Grossman's results are obtained for the LDC's as a group and have
nothing to say on competition between LDC': e.g., they do not exclude predominance of competition
betwcen say Korean and Taiwanese exporters over competition between Korean exporters and
Japanese and U.S. domestic producers.
2Theestimation method used is Fair'svariant of 2SLS [Fair(1970)], takinginto account first-order
serial correlation. All equations are estimated with seasonal dummies, which we do not report here,
they seem to be of no interest. The data are on a quarterly basis, obtained from Bank of Korea
publications [BoK (n.d.)], the IFS data tape or directly from Korean authorities. An appendix with a
detailed description of the data is available on request.
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function h giving E as a function of labour input Le and intermediate inputs
Me (physical capital is kept fixed in the background):3
E = h(Le, Me)h/a, (3)
where a is defined such that h displays constant returns to scale. With capital
kept fixed in the background, it is reasonable to assume a> 1.
Simple cost minimization given (3) and a fixed output level yields
Ce = Eg(W Pi,)(4)
where Ce are the total costs of labour and intermediates used to produce E,
W is the nominal wage rate, and Pim is price of intermediate inputs (taken to
be the Won price of intermediate im-iports in Won).
Now firms will need credit to finance primary cost& during the production
process. Under the assumption that all or a fixed proportion of primary costs
are financed via credit taken out at a cost Fe, profits are [using (4)]
PR = (1 + tsubs)PE - Eag( Pijm)(t + e), (5)
where tsubs is the export subsidy rate, and profit maximization will lead to
(1 +tsubs)(PE+EE aE1) (1+e)g(WP)aE = O (5')
which, after substitution of (I) to eliminate E, log differentiation and some
reshuffling gives (hats indicate percentage changes)
-e= (a -1)(1 + ) - Ifr
Pe =1+(a-1)(1+C) Pf + 1 + (a- 1)(1 + C)
+ 2  (a -- 1)qe
. - . +Yf
1+(a-1)(1+ci) Un l+(a-1)(1+o) r
+ 1 1 dtsub, (6)
l +(a-1)(1 +o-) e 1 + (a-1)(1 + u) I + tsubs(
where 1=wage share in primary costs, 12=1-V1. This is the equation
we will use in our empirical work. Together with the demand eq. (2), the
pricing eq. (6) determines prices and volume of exports.
3The analysis of firm behavior presented here closely follows Bruno (1979).
S. van WIjnbergen, Stagflationary effects f rnonetary stabilization policies 139
The empirical results are
Pe-0.92+0.36 Pf +0.21 W(-2)
(0.33) (3.45) (2.82)
(0.26) (1.00) (0.99)
(7)
d+tsubs+ 0. 13 Pi,, + 3-63 (I + 0-.O () 35 |+t
(2.85) (3.73) (1.45)
(0.99) (1.00) (0.85)
R2 =0.70, estimation period: 66-111/80-11.
The export pricing equation shows, as expected, a strong and immediate
impact of prices of imported intermediate goods (including, among other
things, oil). Wage increases have a weak impact, and that with a delay only.
Similar results have been obtained for Japan, which has a similar labor
market structure [Ueda (1980)]. Also, export subsidies do moderate price
increases, as shown by the negative coefficient on1 dt55 b,/(l + tub,). Increases in
prices of foreign competitors lead to price increases of Korean exports, but
not one for one: The coefficient on Pf = (e P*) is significantly smaller than
one. This plus the clear importance of domestic cost variables in addition to
the importance of foreign prices, confirms our assumption of some market
power of Korea in its exports markets. The equation presents us with a few
puzzles too, however. Changes in foreign real income show up in our export
demand equation and should therefore play a role here too [see eq. (6)]. This
is however not the case, Yf invariably got coefficientis witlh the 'wrong' sign
and deplorable t-statistics (way below 1). As a consecluence the variable was
left out altogether. Further, changes in the cost of credit have a dramatic
impact. The cost of credit is represented by the special interest rate on export
loans. As these are supplied with perfect elasticity at that rate re, )'e really
measures the cost of credit, unlike the bank lending rate on loans to
domestic producers. In fact, the coefficient on in,,rest changes is
embarassingly high [although the reader slhould keep in mind that we use
(f+re4 ooX, not iFJ. In view of the significance of this variable, it is not
surprising to learn that the impact of interest rates on the business sector is
an issue of major concern for the Korean authorities [see Westphal (1975),
especially his description of the turbulent period 1969-1975].
22.2. A,ggregate dLe72L2tl tidand ouliput
Government expenditure is considered a policy variable. Private
consumption (in real terms) depends on a distributed lag of disposable real
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income and the real interest rate. Bank rates are not the relevant rates here,
consumers clearly cannot borrow and lend at the going bank rates at will.
The curb market does offer this opportunity, so one should expect the real
curb market to be the relevant one. This is borne out by empirical evidence
(see below). Both real consumption and real after tax income are derived
from the corresponding rnominal variables by deflatiQn with the CPI. The
results are
CPr = 07 - 3.26 In ( +0.31 ( CT) +0.57C°( )-1),
(1.08) (2.41) (7.28) (8.79) (8)
(0.71) (0.98) (1.00) (1.00)
R= 0.99, estimation period: 66-I/79-IV.
Eq. (8) has a number of interesting features. The long-run saving propensity
out of after tax income is quite high (0.28), a finding that has surely to do
with the high proportion of Korean consumers that derives its income from
agriculture (about 35%/). The more interesting point is however the strong
influence of the real curb market rate. The strong positive impact of this rate
on saving (negative impact on consumption) shows the dominance of
substitution effects over income effects: when future consumption becomes
cheaper in terms of current consumption, both current and future
consumption may rise (income effect), but intertemporal substitution away
from current towards future consumption dominates, leading to a net decline
in current consumption. One of the reasons may be that interest income (and
certainly hard to trace interest eai nings from the UM AM) is not part of
taxable income. This makes the Korean tax system look more like an
expenditure or wage-income tax system than a true income tax system.
Tax revenues themselves are cleariy not exogenous. Personal income taxes
in Korea are largely wage taxes, which are withheld by employers on a
monthly basis; this implies that there is no 'lumpiness' problem, with all of
last year's taxes coming in one quarter. The tax revenue equation links tax
revenues to nominal GDP and nominal imports:
TAXR=-14.6 + 0.05GNPKN(-1)
(1.21) (3.77)
(0.77) (1.00) (9)
+0.07GNPKN(- '±+0.29MNWTOT(-1),
(6.25) (5.63)
(1.00) (1.00)
R2 = 0.99, estimation period: 67-1/79-IV.
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Investment, in an admittedly ad hoc fashion, is assumed to depend on
financial market variables: the cost of credit in the curb market and the flow
of real credit forthcoming from the banking system. The idea behind this is
that firms will first try to get whatever bank financing they can get, as it is
offered at below-market clearing rates. This in turn makes rationing
necessary, which explains why the quantity and not the price variable (real
bank lending rate) is of relevance. For that part of planined investment not
covered by bankloans firms will have to decide whether to go to the curb
market or not to undertake the project involved. For this the real curb
market rate is of relevapce, as the curb-market rate, not hampered by
regulations, clears the credit market [for empirical evidence backing up this
claim, see van Wijnbergen (1981b)]. Changes in the bank lending rate, under
our assumption of rationed bank credit, have no allocative impact, all they
do is change a firm's cash flow position and the 'scarcity premium' earned by
those who manage to obtained rationed loans. The relevant inflation rate in
the definition of the real curb market rate is the rate of change of the own
product price, which reflects the assumption of putty-clay technology [see
Modigliani et al. (1974)]. As at other places in this and the following section
expected values are approximated by actual values, using a rational
expectations argument. The resulting measurement error is taken into
account in the estimation procedure (by using IV on the relevant variables).
The invest,;ient variable is total private fixed capital formation in real terms,
where the deflator used is the wholesale price index.
IGRR=2.48-4.921n[ 1 +PD(-l)/100 (10)
L 1 +PD(-1 j0
(2.81) (2.72)
(0.99) (0.99)
+ 0.76 dLSCBR(-1) + 0.62IGRR(- 1),
(3.28) (6.02)
(1.00) (1.00)
R 2 =0.81, estimation period: 66-1/79-IV.
These results show a strong impact of financial market variables on private
fixed capital formation, with quantity signals (change in real credit to the
private sector outstanding) of relevance in the regulated markets, and price
signals (real interest rate in the curb market) in the unregulated curb market.
These results also point to the importance of crowding out of private
investment by additional government expenditure given tax revenues and
money growth rules enforced via credit ceilings and capital controls [as are
now (81) in operation in Korea]. Under those circumstances, additional
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government expenditures will be financed by increases in credit to the
government, which, given overall credit ceilings, will reduce credit to the
private sector. Eq. (10) demonstrates that such a reduction has an immediate
impact on private investment.
Not all demand for investment goods translates into demand for domestic
goods, substantial parts of it (mainly machinery, etc.) leads to a demand for
capital goods imports. This is captured by a demand equation for imports of
capital goods linking the volume of imports of capital goods to the volume of
private fixed capital formation:
ln(Mcap)=6.65+.161n(IGPRR), (1 1)
(25.6) (11.2)
(1.00) (1.00)
R2 =0.89, estimation period: 65-TII/79-IV.
The elasticity with respect to real investment expenditure is about 1, the
difference with 1 is not significant using a 5% two-tailed test (the relevant t-
statistic is 1.56). No influence was found of relative price variables (in this
case the relative price of foreign capital goods). The domestic component of
private fixed capital formation is dominated by construction, while imports
of capital goods completely consist of machinery and the like, so this
evidence of complementarity should ncot come as a surprise.
The same holds of course for consumption, part of that falls on foreign
goods too. However, imports of consumer goods are small in proportion to
total consumption, and are dominated by rice imports. Rice imports
moreover are entirely government controlled and sold domestically at prices
that do not reflect the price at which they are bought in the world-market.
Accordingly, we take the imports of consumer goods as a control variable of
the government.
The equation describing the remaining category of imports, intermediate
imports, is derived from the same model of firm behaviour used in the
derivation of the pricing equations. There is one complication: we do not
have separate data on intermediate imports used by exporters and by
nonexporters. Accordingly, we have to aggregate the demand functions for
intermediate imports into one demand function. The production model
presented above leads to a demand function for intermediate imports
depending on output, the real price of intermediate imports and the real
interest rate. This can be obtained by simple differentiation of the cost
function. If the production function underlying the unit cost function g is
CES, the resulting demand function will depend on Pim(1 + Fe), Pi and Yi only
(where i is E or D referring to Exporters or producers for the Domestic
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Market):4
Mi = -ai(Pim +(1 + Fj)-Pi)aiY;. (12)
Now total intermediate imports MI equal M, E + MI, D, So
M1=0 1M1 ,E + 2MI,D with Oj=MIj1/M,,
so using (12) we get
MI = 1lOE(Pirr+(l + E) -PE) - 029D(Pim +(1 +FUMM)- PD)
+ O1 a1 RD + 0 2a2E. (13)
In our empirical work we made the further simplification of replacing the
two output components by gross output, GOR=(GDP+MIPim)/PD,5 which is
right if a, = a2 and the shares ki are equal to the corresponding shares in
gross output. The impossibility of splitting up M, over intermediates used for
export production and those used for production for the domestic market
prevented inclusion of disaggregated gross output concepts. The results (in
log-linear form rather than percentage changes) are
In(Min)= 10.9+ 1.35 1n(GOR)-0.85 1n(Pt p )
(12.0) (11.7) (1.90)
(1.00) (1.00) (0.94)
-0.21 In( 1 -0. 12 In ( (14O
(0.49) (1.15)
(0.38) (0.74)
-0.34 In(I rumm( - 1)/100)
(2.67)
(0.99)
R'=0.84, , =0.8, estimation period: 66-I/79-IV.
4 A reminder may be useful: the bar on Fi indicates we are talking about a real interest rate.
'GDP Nominal gross domestic product.
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The equation shows a strong impact of gross output, but relative prices
and the cost of credit play a significant role too. For exporters relative prices
seem to be more important, and the cost of credit less than they are for
producers for the domestic markets.
2.2.3. Wages and prices
The pricing equation explaining prices of Korean products sold to the
domestic market is a simple mark up on prime costs, wages and intermediate
inputs, with the added novelty of the assumption that these costs are
financed bv credit taken out at the curb market and commercial bank credit:
Pd=ao+alW+a2 pim+a3 (l +UMM), (15)
where the constant term is supposed to capture 'trend' productivity growth
due to capital accumulation and technological progress. The relevant interest
rate is the real curb market rate, the rationale behind this is similar to the
argument presented when we discussed the investment function. Like in most
pricing equations estmated for DC's [see the well known Eckstein (1972)
volume, Nordhaus (1972) and numerous other papers in BPEA], aggregate
demand does not play a significant role in this mark-up. As a result, the
model essentially is a sticky price model (producers just pass through cost
factors), with output demand determined. Over time however, demand side
pressure comes in via the effect of unemployment on real wages. In analyzing
price setting for Korean products sold on the domestic market, we
distinguish between the price of rice (taken to be a policy variable) and the
price of other goods. Other implications of the distinction between
agriculture and the rest of the economy are not yet taken into account [a
version of this model that incorporates the agricultural sector explicitly is
presented in van Wijnbergen (1981b)]. The pricing equation for PD comes
out as follows:
Pd -7.94+0.54(1±ruMM/100)-0.014(1+Pd(-1)/100
(1.81) (3.50) (0.66)
(0.92) (1.00) (0.49)
-0.057(l+P( -2)/00 + 0.1 5(P?, e) +0.33(I -1)e(-1))
(3.18) (1.75) (11,2) (16)
(1.00) (0.91) (1.00)
+0.10(P*,(-2)e(- 2)) + 0.22 a/(- 1)-0.071V(-2)+0.151V(- 3),
(3.09) (2.98) (1.03) (2.27)
(1.00) (1.00) (0.69) (0.97)
R= 0.90, p = 0.2, estimation period: 66-11/80-II.
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As in the export pricing equation, wages come in with a delay sonly. There
is also a strong and much quicker (when compared with the impact of wage
changes) response to changes in the Won-price of intermediate imports,
e P,*, This considerably complicates exchange rate management, because the
exchange rate is a component of the Won-price of intermediate imports. 6
Turning to the cost of credit variables, we found that the commercial bank
lending rate had no impact on Pd whatsoever. The curb market rate rUMM
does show up strongly however, a result that is compatible with our story of
rationed bank credit and spillover of excess demand into the UMM. Pd then
is added to the price index of rice (after suitable weighting, of course) to give
the wholesale price index WPIK (the weights refer to the base year of the
series, 1975):
WPIK = 0.9804PD + 0.0696Pricc. (17)
The consumer price index is also a weighted average of the price of rice
and PD (domestic price of non-rice goods produced in Korea),7 but the
timing and weights are different. The timing of the non-rice component is
based on regression analysis
CPIK = 4.52 + 0.6 4 PD + 0.1 1 PD(- 1) + 0.27CPIrice,
(4.50) (4.68) (0.69)P (4.78)
(1.00) (1.00) (0.51) (1.00) (18)
R2 =0.99, estimation period: 65-11/80-III.
The third endogenous price in this model, the price of Korean exports, has
been dealt with in section 2.2.1.
Now wages. The wage equation is a traditional expectation augmented
Phillips curve, with one special twist: we do allow for catch-up wage
demands when last period's inflation was higher than anticipated. The
relevant inflation rate is of course the CPI inflation rate. The catch-up effect
is modeled in a particularly simple way: assume workers have a target real
wage W*. At the end of the period, workers will set their nominal wage
demands based on their current nominal wage and the anticipated CPI
inflation rate over the coming period; if however an inflation surprise has
eroded their real wage below W*, there will be pressure for additional
'In the presence of intermediate imports, a devaluation has an unambiguously stagflationary
impact. See van Wijnbergen (1980) for this point.
'Imports of non-rice consumer goods are negligible in Korea. Rice imports are handled by the
government and sold at prices unrelated to the worldmarket prices at which they were bought.
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nominal wage increases to catch up with this erosion,8
WV=c 0 +C1CPIi+c2 U(-1)- t+C3 W* CP(- l) (19)
If W* is a declining function of U, say W*=fo +fi U(- 1)-', we get
W-aO+aCPIe+a2 U(- 1) + a3 Cp(_ )(19')
If being off target counts last period, a3 should be significantly less than
zero. (19') can be used to define a target wage given the beginning of period
wage, unemployment and expected CPI inflation. Gradual adjustment
towards that target wage gives rise to the following wage equation:
In (W) --0.68 + 0.20 (ln(CPIK) - ln(CPIK(- 1))
(3.40) (0.72)
(1.00) (0.52)
-0.38 (ln(W(- 1))-ln(CPIK(- 1))
(3.57) (20)
+ 1.14 ln(W(- 1)) + 0.52 USA( - 1)
(2.66) (2.54)
(1.00) (0.99)
R' = 0.99, estimation period: 66-1/79-I.
The results show the importance of catch-up wage demands, the term
capturing that effect has a strongly negative coefficient (a t-statistic of 3.57).
Further the moderating impact of unemployment (adjusted for seasonal
variation) on wage demands is clear, the inverse of the beginning of period
unemployment rate adjusted for seasonal variation, USA(- 1), shows up with
a significantly positive term.
2.2.4. Closing the real sector model
Two more equations are needed to close the real sector part of the model.
The first concerns employment, the second potential output.
In line with the putty-clay assumption used elsewhere in this model, we do
not use a neoclassical labor demand function linking labor demand to real
8U is measured as end of period unemployment, so we want U(- 1) in eqs. (19) and (19').
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product wages and output. Instead we used a variant on Okun's law linking
(seasonally adjusted) unemployment to the gap between potential output
GNPPOT and actual output (also seasonally adjusted). The seasonal
adjustment factors are derived in a mechanical way using the Bureau of the
Census X-II method. The results came out as follows:
USA=l.10+ 1.22
(2.64) (0.21)
(0.99) (0.16)
GNPPOT(-1)-GNPKRSA- 0), (21)
GNPPOT(-13 J+O70SA-1,321
(1.00)
R2 =0.52, estimation period: 69-III/79-IV.
This equation would imply a 'natural rate' of unemployment of 3.7%,
which seems reasonable both with respect to actual unemployment in
equilibrium years like 76 (around 4% after seasonal adjustment), and to
estimates made by labormarket experts. Soh (1975) of KDI for example
suggests 3.5%.
The second equation links potential GNP to real fixed capital formation:
GNPPO T =-0.22 + 0.04IGPRR
(0.90) (0.74)
(0.63) (0.54) (22)
+0.02IGPRR(- 1) + 1.03GNPPOT(- 1),
(0.40) (52.7)
(0.31) (1.00)
R2= 0.99, estimation period: 68-1/78-IV.
The equation links potential output to new capital equipment coming on
stream, last year's potential output and technological change (leading to
increases in capacity output even at zero net investment). Also, the implied
incremental capital/output ratio (about 4, after conversion to annual figures),
is not unreasonable.
3. The financial sector
In the model to be presented below, we will incorporate the stylized facts
mentioned in the introduction. The approach taken is heavily influenced by
the Yale-portfolio allocation model associated with James Tobin (1975). The
148 S. van Wijnhergen, Stagflationarv etfects of monetary stabilization policies
main features of this model are the assumption of imperfect substitution
between different assets and the attention paid to the impact of balance sheet
constraints on the specification of behavioural equations and the structure of
the model. Further salient features are an explicit incorporation of the curb
market and financial intermediaries and the attention paid to the role played
by firms and banks (rather than private wealth holders, as is usually done) in
determining foreign capital inflows.
3.1. Deposit Money Banks (DMB's)
DMB's can be subdivided into domestic commercial banks and branch
offices of foreign banks.9 Although the size of the loan portfolio of foreign
banks is relatively small, there is an important difference between them and
Korean banks that warrants special attention: their liability structure is
entirely different, with inter-office loans from abroad making up roughly 60%
of their sources of funds (in 1980). Foreign sources provide only 2% of the
total of funds available to domestic banks. These inter-office loans sky-
rocketed after the creation of special swap arrangements, available to nireign
banks only, under which foreign banks sell foreign currency to the BoK
under repurchase contracts. In the model presented here we will treat inter-
office loans from abroad separately from other foreign borrowing by DMB's.
Table I
DMB borrowing at foreign capital markets (in
billion Won).
Inter-office
loans to Other DMB
foreign borrowing
offices abroad
Dec. 74 43 238
Dec. 75 114 305
Dec. 80 1,875 1,055
Inter-office ioans to Korean branch offices by their parent banks are
determined in the portfolio allocation process of these parent banks. This
leads to an equation linking the volume of inter-office loans LNIO to the
total volume of loans made by foreign (mainly Japanese and U.S.) banks,
Korean, Japanese and U.S. interest rates and, in general, the expected rate of
'These two groups make up what are called 'commercial banks' in Korean statistics. A third
category of DMB's, so-called 'Special Banks' (banks for agriculture, housing, fishery and the Korean
Exchange Bank), are small (roughly 10°' of the DMB's loan volume is theirs), so we lumped them
together with domestic commercial banks.
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devaluation of the Won versus the U.S. dollar and the Yen. Due to the
exchange rate regime over the estimation period (pegging to the U.S. dollar),
only expectations with respect to the Yen are relevant. Preliminary
estimations showed a total irrelevance of U.S. variables, inter-office loans are
apparently dominated by those from Japan. The results (after exclusion of
U.S. variables) are
lnLNIO 1=-35.8 + 5.98 In L i RLD/l00
LERWYJ 
-l+RLCBJI/IO0
(18.6) (6.45)
(1.00) (1.00)
+3.31 ln!ERWY+0.50DSWAP,
(19.9) (3.83)
(1.00) (1.00) (23)
R2 = 0.98, estimation period: 70-11/80-11,
where LSCBJ is the Total Loan Supply Japanese Banks in Won, LNIO are
Inter Office loans (Won), ERWY is the Won-Yen exchange rate, RLCBJ is
the Japanese call money rate, RLD is the Korean Bank lending rate, and
DSWAP is the Dummy for swap arrangements; 0 before 75, 1 from there on.
Interest rate differentials between Korean lending rates (which foreign
branch offices can charge on their loans) and the rate on comparable short-
run bank assets in Japan (call money) come in very significantly (a t-statistic
of 6.45), as does the total of all loans and discounts by Japanese banks. The
dummy accounting for the introduction of swap arrangements with the BoK
also has a significant coefficient and the 'right' sign. Expected exchange rate
changes did not have a significant effect. This could be due to discrepancies
between the premium implied by the swap arrangement and actual
expectations. No information is av-aable on the terms of these arrangements,
so this is impossible to verify.
Borrowing abroad by domestic banks depends on domestic lending rates
and the costs of obtaining funds abroad: as long as the marginal cost of
borrowing abroad is less than the lending rate, the stock of foreign liabilities
slhould be increased. The costs of borrowing abroad depend on the relevant
Eurodollar rate, a country-specific mark-up factor, and the cost of obtaining
government guarantees. In the model analyzed in appendix A,' 0 these latter
costs are assumed to be an increasing function of the banks total foreign
"'Available upon request.
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liabilities. Further, there is evidence [Kim (1976)], that the BoK encourages
private banks and firms to borrow abroad when the BoK's Net F:oreign
Assets (NFA) is considered tight. We tried to capture this by including the
number of months of imnports that could be financed from current NFA
stock of the BoK as a proxy for this effect. The appropriate scale variable in
the equation would have been net worth of the DMB's, which we
approximate by a time trend. Finally we borrowed from finance theory the
notion that a firm should maximize its value in terms of the goods its
shareholders consume, which leads to the CPI as the appropriate deflator.
All this leads to
Lf =-0.67 + 0.1 O(RLD - RE UR) + 0.02 TIMECPI
(1.08) (2.34) (1.59)
(0.71) (0.97) (0.88)
(24)
- 1.85 NFA(-l1) ±0.62 Lf (-l)
MNWTOT(-1) CPI(-1)'
(3.18) (5.06)
(1.00) (1.00)
R 2 =0.79, estimation period: 70-1/80-111.
As in the previous equation, the relevant interest rate differentials (here
between the Eurodollar rate and the Korean bank lending rate) strongly
influence the foreign liabilities banks choose to incur. Not surprisingly, the
data did not contain sufficient information to capture the effect of exchange
rate expectations: the relevant rate is the Won-dollar rate, which was rixed
over most of the sample period. The proxy for BoK manipulation of cost
and availability of loan guarantees, last periods Net Foreign Assets of the
BoK (end of period value) over last periods total imports, is highly
significant and has the right sign. This lends support to Kim's (1976) claim
that the BoK encourages the private sector to borrow abroad whenever
reserves are tight and vice versa.
Other sources cf funds are dominated by time and saving deposits and, to
a lesser extent, demand deposits. These are covered in the section on private
portfolio allocation. Finally the BoK is an important source of funds (about
A0"X' of total DMB liabilities is with respect to the BoK). BoK to DMB
lending is considered a policy instrument.
Then the assets side. The model underlying bank behavior is spelled out in
the appendix, but let us repeat the results for the loan supply function. Loans
extended to non-exporters will depend positively on the lending rate and
beginning of period availability of funds from depositors and the BoK. They
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will further depend negatively on the BoK discount rate and reserve
requirements, all standard results. Via a mechanism we discuss in the
appendix one expects a negative correlation with the volume of export loans,
but this effect turned out to be very weak and was therefore omitted. Finally,
as shown in the appendix, the loan supply to non-exporters will, in the
absence of reserve requirements against foreign liabilities, depend one for one
on current foreign liabilities, the other policy instrument in the hands of the
DMB's here considered. All this leads to a loan supply function for loans to
non-exporters:
Lne = -9.9 + 10.5(RLD-RDJSC) + ±.93 DEP(- 1)
(1.23) (2.73) (50.9)
(0.77) (0.99) (1.00)
(25)
+ 0.60 NDCCB(-1) + 0.999(Lf + LNIO),
(7.18) (6.67)
(1.00) (1.00)
R2=0.99, estimation period: 66-1/79-I,
where DEP is th. end of period sum of demand, time and savings deposits.
NDCCB is end of period net borrowing from the BoK. The 'net' refers to the
fact that we netted out the item 'securities' against borrowing from the BoK.
This item consists mainly of government bonds, stock in government-run
enterprises, etc. [Kim (1976)]. DMB's are really captive buyers for all these
things, so we netted them out against BoK credit to DMB's.
The estimation period was confined to (66-1/79-I) because the Korean
authorities switched towards direct limits on total bank lending as an
instrument of monetary policy in the second quarter of 1979. The equation
shows a strong impact of the difference between the lending rate and the
discount rate.1 ' Beginning of period deposits and net credit from the BoK
have a significant impact on end of period loans, as expected. An earlier
version contained the rate of reserve requirements RR and loans to exporters
(see below) to capture the crowding out effect of the preferential credit policy
with respect to exporters, but the relevant coefficients were insignificantly
different from zero although they did have the right sign (negative). Finally
the prediction of a one for one pass-through of funds borrowed abroad into
loans extended domestically is clearly confirmed.
"Apart from their sign the coefficients when estimated separately were not significantly different
from each other, so we imposed equality.
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The final component of domestic credit is credit to exporters. Commercial
bank extend loans to exporters at subsidized rates, but can rediscount 80% of
them at the BoK, also at subsidized rates. There is no quantity constraint on
that rediscounting facility. Accordingly loans to exporters are demand-
determined and will be dealt with in the subsection of firm behavior.
The remaining two items on the asset side are required and free reserves.
Required reserves clearly follow from the liability structure. Free reserves
then become the residual item, dictated by the behavioral equations specified
above and the balance sheet constraint stating that total liabilities are equal
to total assets.
3.2. Firm behavior
For our analysis of the financial sector, we are mainly interested in the
liability management of firms. There is a clear dichotomy here between
exporters and non-exporters; exporters have essentially unlimited access to
bank credit and therefore have no incentive to enter the Unofficial Money
Market as borrowers. Their demand for loans is simply based on the model
presented in van Wijnbergen (1979a), where demand for loans depends on
the level of output, the costs of inputs and the real cost of credit. This leads
to the following result:
n - 5.60- 0.49n 1 +RLEX/100)
(2.55) (1.25)
(0.99) (0.79)
PMINT x ERWID
-+ 0.84 In -_ _ _ _ _ _ _
(2.22) Pcx (26)
(0.97)
+ 0.57 ln(E) + 0.38 In
(3.47) (2.64)
(1.00) (0.99)
R2 =0.96, estimation period: 66-1/79-IV,
where LEx are loans to exporters (billion Won), RLEx is lending rate charged
on LEX. PCX are Won price of exports, PMINT is the Dollar price of
intermediate imports, ERWD is the Won-dollar exchange rate, and E are real
exports.
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Somewhat surprisingly, the cost of intermediate inputs is the only input
cost factor to show up significantly, wage costs do not seem to play a role
here. The real cost of credit parameter has the right sign and a plausible
magnitude, but is estimated very imprecisely, the t-statistic on its parameter
is only 0.79. The other parameters present no surprises.
Non-exporting firms face a different situation. Bank loans are rationed,
they face a quantity constraint. For the rest of their credit needs they have to
either enter the curb market or the Eurodollar market.' 2 Given their balance
sheet constraint, a behavioral equation for one of the two will imply one for
the other. We are choosing the foreign liability part; so we now turn to
foreign sources of credit and the capital account of the BoK.
Unfortunately there is no way to separate foreign liabilities incurred by the
export sector from those incurred by the non-export sector, so we are forced
to estimate an aggregate function explaining total foreign liabilities as a share
of all liabilities incurred by Firms as a function of the Eurodollar market rate,
the curb market rate (the alternative source of funds for non-exporters), and
the rate on export loans (the alternative source of funds for exporters). The
result is eq. (8):
1(FLPSW\ 181 REUR~ RUMM"In WPI K 0.41 -128 In I +--1-¢0 ) +0.15 In (K1  100
(2.15) (1.96) (0.91)
(0.96) (0.94) (0.63)
-0.04xlIn t+e, o 0.05In( l+±100 )
(0.55) (0.88)
(0.42) (0.57)
-0.16NFA(- 1)/MNWTOT(- 1) (27)
(3.64)
(1.00)
+01 nFLPSW+LSDMBNEjLEX +LSUMM)
+0.18 Int WPIK)
(3.07)
(1.00) FLS(t)
+ 0.69 In WFPIK(-1)~WPIK( -1C
(19.5)
(1.00)
R2=0.99, estimation period: 69-41/79-I,
1 2 Retained earnings are modeled as a loan from the firm owner to the firm and are lumped togethler
with loans from the curb market.
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where FLPSW are total net foreign liabilities of the non-bank/non-
government sector (billion Won), REUR is the Eurodollar rate in London (3
months), RUMM is the curb market rate, and LSUMM is the volume of
UMM loans outstanding.
The domestic lending rate did not play any role at all which should not
come as a surprise after what was said in the previous sections on
disequilibrium in the market for bank credit. The curb market rate does
come in with the right sign and a coefficient that seems to have a reasonable
magnitude, but the standard error is quite large. The 3-month Eurodollar
rate has the expected negative sign, as do the proxies for expected exchange
rate changes. Also our proxy for BoK encouragement to borrow abroad in
periods of 'tight' reserves shows up significantly and with the right sign.
Finally the equation can degenerate into a 'flow-' approach equation if the
coefficient of the lagged endogenous variable (which came in via a stock-
adjustment scheme) is not significantly different from one, thus allowing for a
test of the two approaches (stock versus flow approach to the capital account
of the BoK) against each other. The flow version is definitely rejected, with a
t-statistic on the difference between the coefficient of the lagged left-hand side
variable and one of 8.86, thus confirming our 'stock-' approach to the capital
account.
Eq. (27), together with the CA-deficit that comes out of the part of the
model presented in Chapter 8, plus some accounting identities allow us to
derive the Net Foreign Assets position of the consolidated banking system,
the second component of the money supply. More on that in section 5. For
the determination of money demand, we have to consider the private sector's
portfolio allocation. This we will do in the next section.
3.3. The private sector
The analysis of the commercial banking system and a part of the non-
bank business sector presented in the two previous sections allow us to build
up the components of the supply of M2. The demand for M2 and its
components comes out of the public's allocation of its wealth over M2 and
other assets. Private individuals can hold their wealth either as currency,
demand or time deposits at DMB's or as loans outstanding at the UMM.
The latter option comes down to direct lending to firms, bypassing the
bankirig system (disintermediation).
Contrary to what is usually assumed in the (scarce) literature on this
subject, the UMM is largely an urban phenomenon in Korea. In a survey
done by the Sogang University of Seoul, it was found that 79'% of UMM
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lending was to the urban business sector, 7T% to urban consumers and the
remaining 14° to rural households (the survey was undertaken in 1969). Kim
(1976), from whom this information is taken, does not provide information
on sample design etc., so one should be careful in interpreting these data.
Moreover Kim (1976) reports that urban and rural credit markets are
entirely separated. In what follows we will confine our attention to the urban
business sector.
In the same survey it was found that 75(% of all firms responding had
some debts outstanding at the UMM, while lO"% had more than 50°, of their
debts at the UMM. The importance of the UMM has been declining over
time however, since the interest rate reform in 1965 improved the functioning
of financial intermediaries, and with increasingly easy access to foreign
capital markets. Nevertheless the UMM continues to play an important role.
For many small firms the UMM is the only place to go when turned down
by commercial banks (which, as mentioned earlier, only happens to non-
exporters, exporters have automatic access to credit). In the same survey,
93%tO of the firms with UMM debts gavc as the reason for operating in the
UMM the unavailability of (sufficient amounts of) bank credit. It seems clear
that, from the demand side, the UMM is largely a spillover phenomenon
kept alive by the occurrence of credit rationing by commercial banks, which
have no control over their lending rates.
So much for the demand for UMM loans, but who supplies them? In the
Sogang University survey, 73%"O of the loans made to the urban business
sector came from 'relatives and friends and professional money lenders' with
the latter taking up 33%/. 7.3¶' came from 'men of same trade' and the
remaining 19.3% from 'miscellaneous', including merchants. So only about
20",, represents trade credit. According to Kim (1976), professional money
lenders are usually middlemen acting for wealthy businessmen. These results
seem to lend support to the approach taken in van Wijnbergen (1979a).
There I assumed that, in the absence of significant securities -mat kets and an
open market in interest-bearing government debt, individuals can hold their
wealth as currency, savings and demand deposits at the banks, or engage in
direct lending to the business sector via the UMM (financial
disintermediation). This leads to traditional portfolio allocation equations for
the different M2-components, with RUMM, RTD, (61I, income and wealtlh
(M2+LSUMM) as arguments."3 , 4 The loan supply at the UMM can then
be derived via the wealth constraint a private individual faces,
'RIA IA I is the curb market rate, RTD is the time deposit rate, CIl is CPI inflation (= minus the
real rate of return on cash balances), LSUJMM is the volume of loans outstanding at the curb market.
'
4 Simple accounting shows that within the rinancial structure assumed here, M2+ LSUMM equals
the monetary base plus the value of the capital stock; accordingly this is an appropriate definition of
wealth.
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In CPI =0.36-0.891n 1+ RUM ±1.631In 1 +RT
/ 100 ( 1001
(1.71) (2.42) (4.08)
(0.91) (0.98) (1.00)
0381( CPIK ( GNPKN1+--- 0.01n CPIK
(3.51) (0.53) (28)
(1.00) (0.40)
+0.93 In (CTK( -1))'
(42.4)
(1.00)
R 0=997, p=0.3, estimation period: 64-I/79-IV.
Reshuffling the variables to derive dependence on real rates of return of
course leaves the coefficients on the two interest rates unchanged, but results
in a negative coefficient for the real rate of return on currency (minus the
CPI inflation rate): the coefficient on In(1+C PCITK/100) becomes +0.36. See
table 2.
Table 2
Elasticity wvith respect to the real rate of return on:
Alternative asset 1: the cuib market In 1+ RUM -In I+ -CP IK -0.89
.1 \. 100/]
Alternative asset 2: currency (I1n(1 +If1! )) -0.36
RTD CPIK)
Itselfi: time deposits In 1 + - In K 1 + -)): + 1.63
Clearly, substitution between the curb market and time deposits is of more
importance than substitution between currency and time deposits. This is of
crucial importance for the analysis of the effect of time deposit rate changes
on inflation and economic activity. The fact that TD's are closer substitutes
to curb market loans than to Ml, together with the absence of wealth effects
on the demand for time deposits (via which increased savings could have
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becn channeled into TD's over time), is a strong indication that the
phenomenal increase mn time deposits after the interest rate reform in 1965
was caused by a switch from lending at the UMM to time deposits at DMB's
by private asset holders, and not by additional savings as is usually claimed.
The equation for Ml showed no significant wealth or interest rate effects,
but a strong dependence on the own rate of return, mirus the CPI inflation
rate:
In ( :K) =0.08-0.40 In (1 + cPIK) + 0.03 In (GCIKN)
(0.81) (4.50) (0.50)
(0.58) (1.00) (0.38)
(29)
+ 0.97 In l(- 1))
(CPIK(- 1)
(21.6)
(1.00)
R2 =0.998, estimation period: 64-I/79-IV.
Eqs. (28) and (29) imply a reasonable supply equation for loans on the
curb market via the wealth constraint, with positive dependence on its own
real rate of return, negative dependence on the real rate of return on the two
alternative assets (Ml and Time Deposits) and a unit wealth elasticity.
Finally we have to describe the allocation of Ml over demand deposits
and currency because we need total deposits (TD and DD) in the loan supply
equation of DMB's. For simplicity, we choose a variant on the fixed
currency-DD ratio:
DD =2.81 4±0.18M+0.69DD(- 1),
(0.19) (2.70) (5.37) (30)
(0.15) (0.99) (1.00)
R'=0.99, estimation period: 66-1/80-IV,
which represents a gradual adjustment to a fixed share of demand deposits in
Ml.
3.4. Pulling the threads together
The building blocks outlined in the preceding sections allow us to
construct money (M2) supply and demand.
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The money supply simply equals
M2s=NNCG+LnC+LEx+NFA-OL, (31)
NDCG, Net Domestic Credit to the Government, equals last period's NDCG
plus the fraction of the budget the government chooses to finance via
recourse to the BoK. Credit to the private sector [to non-exporters (Lne) and
to exporters (LEX)] is explained by eqs. (25) and (36). All this is fairly
straightforward. One has to be careful however in setting up NFA, Net
Foreign Assets of the consolidated banking system (the BoK and the DMB's).
Clearly foreign borrowing by the banking system does not affect their net
assets position,' 5 this changes only via an unbalanced current account and
foreign capital inflows into the non-bank sector. A further wrinkle is added
by exchange rate changes: capital gains (losses) on beginning of period Net
Foreign Assets because of intra period exchange rate changes do increase end
of period Net Foreign Assets, but do not automatically lead to changes in the
money supply. The capital gain (loss) on the asset side is offset by a matching
entry in a revaluation account on the liability side, leaving M2 unchanged.
We have 'submerged' this revaluation account into the residual category
Other Liabilities, OL, which therefore follows eq. (32):16
* ER WD(t) - ER WD(t - 1)
OL(t) = O L(t) + NFA(t -1) x ERWD(t - 1) (32)
The demand side of the money market is simply the sum of the demand
for currency, demand and time deposits by the public:
M2D=Ml+ TD (33)
with Ml and TD determined in eqs. (29) and (30).
The final equilibrium condition, implicitly determining the curb market
rate, is simply
M2s = M2D. (34)
It is easy to show by appropriate use of accounting indentities, the balance
sheet constraints imposed on all the actors in this model and the assumption
that demand and time deposits are demand determined, that (34) translates
into a demand equals supply condition for monetary base (the 'inside'
component of M2) with demand coming from the public (currency) and
"
5 We endogenized these capital inflows via the banking system nevertheless [eqs. (23) and (24)]
because of the role they play in determining the DMB's loan supply.
"
6 Note that all variables refer to end of period values.
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banks (reserves) and supply determined by accumulated credit to the
government and Net Foreign Assets.
A final accounting identity incorporated in the model, and needed to close
it, is worth mentioning explicitly here. We have explicitly linked saving by
private individuals to private asset accumulation. As said before, private
assets are either held as loans on the curb market (LSUMM), currency or
demand and time deposits at DMB's.
The savings/asset accumulation implies that nominal private saving should
equal nominal increases in total wealth:' 7
LSUMM(t) + M2(t) = LSUMM(t -1) + M2(t-1) + GNPKN(t)
- TA XR(t)-CPRN(t) (35)
or disposable income minus private consumption equals wealth
accumulation. Although this is of course standard in theoretical growth
models, we are not aware of applied models that display this consistency
between beginning of period asset stocks, savings decision determined in the
real sector and the end of period asset stocks whose composition is
determirned in the financial sector. The model presented here seems to be the
first applied model that integrates the real and financial sector in an
internally consistent way. It can generate the national accounts, flow of
funds and end of period asset stocks and composition that are internally
consistent with each other and with the beginning of period asset stocks
carried over from the previous period.
4. Some simulation exercises
To indicate the empirical relevance of short-run stagflationary effects of tight
money policies, I present some simulation runs set up with the model presented in
the previous two sections. The variables singled out for presentation are first of all
the inflation rate and real output; then the current account to see whether
expenditure adjustment has also taken place; and finally, real investment, as we
would like to know whether, given a certain downward adjustment in
expenditure, it comes from consumption or investment. This issue is clearly of
relevance when analyzing potential medium-term costs of short-run stabilization
attempts.
The first series of figures (figs. 2a-5a) compares the base-run results using
actual data for money growth with a simulation run where we enacted a once and
for all reduction in the level of M2 in the first quarter of 1979 of 5%.18 The second
"'This is compatible with real savings equals real wealth accumulation if real income is defined
properly (i.e., includes capital gains, etc.). See for example Levhari and Patinkin (1968).
"
8The runs are derived with a version of the model in which capital controls and direct credit limits
are used to directly control M2.
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series of pictures (figs. 2b-5b) compares the base level run with a simulation run
where we chopped 10% off the M2 growth rate in all the three years considered. In
the discrete time framework considered here the reduction in M2 growth is really
equivalent to a repeated series of reductions in the level, with the shocks
increasing in absolute size. The actual (M21) and simulated M2-path (M22 for the
one-shot level change, M23 for the reduced growth rate) are given in fig. 1.
M2 (BILLION NON)
16.0 - - -- -- 15.0
li.00
110z<1A12.0 -1.
10.0 -0-0 -10.0
6.0 - -6.0
5.0 - - .0
II1 ]  IV I I1 ]II IV I I] ]]I IV
1979 2980 1981
Fig. 1
Let us consider the effects of a one-shot monetary contraction, figs. 2a-5a.
The impact on inflation is exactly as predicted. The 5% reduction in M2 with
respect to the base level value in the same period (not with respect to the previous
period!) has a dramatic impact on inflation in the first quarter. In judging the size
of the junp oine should of course keep in mind that the contraction enacted here is
larger than anything that could qualify as a feasible policy measure. Demand
effects take over later on: inflation is actually reduced below base level values for
the next 2 quarters. After that we are back to normal again, as one would expect
after a once and for all reduction in the level of M2. The drop in output starts
immediately, becomes more severe in the second quarter when restrictive demand
effects are added, and then fades away in the 3rd and 4th quarter. Over the first
year, the real output loss caused by the 5% cut in M2 is about 2% of real GNP.
Expenditure however also adjusts, as can be seen from the results from the current
account data presented in fig. 4a: after a slight deterioration in the first quarter,
restrictive demand effects take over and the current account deficit improves
considerably (with about 1 billion US$). However, as can be seen from fig. 5a, the
adjustment falls on investment. After the first year, all variables return to base-
run levels.
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If instead of a once and for all reduction in M2, we enact a series of such shocks
via a reduction in the M2-growth rate, the results become quite dramatic. The
policy measure enacted is rather drastic, the 10% chopped off the M2 growth rate
cuts it roughly in half. Again, we see the initial perverse impact on inflation (fig.
2b), but now the inflation-reducing effect in later quarters is more or less kept in
check by the inflationary impulses emanating from the new shocks coming in. In
the long run of course demand effects will win, when output and employment fall
enough to break the inflationary inertia via the wage-price spiral. As this
simulation shows, the long-run may be very long indeed. Anybody who has
followed the Chilean experiences after Pinochet took over in the early seventies,
will not be surprised by the extreme sluggishness of inflation with respect to
monetary restraint; it may come as a healthy reminder to monetarists who see
cuts in M2 growth as the cure to all ills, however. The other results will not come
as a surprise: the loss in outpat (see fig. 2b) increases as inflation keeps hovering at
the base level values, indicating an increasingly tight monetary situation.
Consumption does respond to the loss in real income and the high real rate, but
the more dramatic expenditure adjustment once again, comes from investment
(fig. 5b). All this adds up to a significant improvement in the current account. The
sluggishness of inflation may be more of a problem in Korea than in other
countries because the particular labour market structure causes considerable lags
before real wage pressure can be reduced by unemployment; the basic message is
clear however in both simulation runs: Monetary restraint has serious costs in
terms of lost output and investment, causes an initially perverse response of the
inflation rate due to the credit-supply side link peculiar to LDC's and may take
considerable time before it brings inflation down. The initial effect actually comes
as an adverse supply shock, increasing inflation and reducing output; later on
traditional demand shock effects take over, with the main expenditure
adjustment coming from investment rather than consumption.
What are the conclusions to be drawn from this? That monetary restraint is
always bad? Clearly not. This analysis warns however that initial results may be
perverse and the good results slow in arriving, with high costs in terms of lost
output and investment.
If reduction in the money growth rate is a costly way of bringing inflation
down, what are the alternatives? One set of policy measures would combine the
absence of LR effects of one-shot changes in the level with the long-run
effectiveness of changes in the growth rate of money. An initial increase in the level
of M2, coupled with a subsequent reduction in the growth rate, if 'tuned'
correctly, will reduce inflation over time and avoid the perverse impact effects: the
perverse impact effects of the lower growth rate are offset by the beneficial effects
of the increase in the level. In the long-run only the growth rate matters, so this
way one gets the best of both worlds. There is a snag of course: any anti-inflation
package relying on lower money growth rates, but starting out with an increase in
the level of the money-stock will run into serious credibility problems. Similar
JOE B
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packages could be worked out however with the increase in the level of M2
replaced by a decrease in time deposit rates; instead of increasing the money
supply one would then reduce (the level of) money demand. Such a policy package
would also meet a more orthodox objection brought up by Robert Mundell:
assume a lower growth rate of money succeeds in slowing down the inflation rate.
This means that the return on holding money, minus the inflation rate, will have
gone up. Accordingly real money demand will be higher than before in the new
equilibrium. So somewhere along the adjustment path, the real money stock will
have to increase to accommodate this. Stringently enforced money growth rate
rules do this by causing a prolonged recession, leading to an inflation rate lower
than money growth somewhere along the adjustment path, thus increasing the
real money stock. Our policy package would solve this problem (known as the
velocity problem or the Mundell-effect) painlessly via the one shot increase in the
money supply 'up front'.
Still to be solved however is the problem that lower M2 growth takes so much
time to slow down inflation, even if we solve the perverse impact effects via either
the one-shot increase in the level of M2 or a lower time deposit rate early on in the
program. One alternative can be constructed that would solve this problem too: I
have a variant of the crawling peg experiment tried out by Argentina and Chile
recently, in mind: a slow down in the rate of devaluation. If implemented
correctly, perverse impact effects (a real appreciation in this case) can probably be
avoided, while a slow-down in the rate of devaluation would have a much faster
impact on inflation than slower money growth because of its impact on local
currency prices of intermediate imports such as oil. Further discussion of this
policy is outside the scope of this paper; I have discussed this policy elsewhere
[van Wijnbergen (1979b)].
5. Conclusions
In the previous sections of this paper we have presented a macro-model of the
Korean eccnomy that focuses on short-run macro-economic adjustment and,
more in particular, on the transmission channels of monetary policy between the
financial and the real sector of the economy. Apart from the usual link between
monetary policy and aggregate demand via investment, we have incorporated the
link between monetary policy and the supply side of the economy via the
financing of working capital with borrowed funds. This link can potentially
reverse the short-run impact of tight money on inflation and aggregate the impact
on output. The results I think are quite strong. Both export prices and domestic
prices show a significant sensitivity to cost of financing working capital (the
special rate on export loans in the case of export prices and the UMM rate in the
case of domestic prices). This credit-supply side link gives a stagflationary bias to
restrictive credit policies.
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The empirical relevance of this phenomenon is strongly supported by the
simulation results derived with the model. The stagflationary effects on a one-
shot reduction in M2 (effected via credit limits and capital controls) dominate
strongly in the first quarter, causing inflation to accelerate; traditional demand
effects via an investment slump take over in the third and fourth quarter, after
which neutrality with respect to level-changes in the money stock is restored.
Changes in the growth rate of money are shown to have stagflationary effects that
persist much longer than that. An alternative set of policy measures would
combine the absence of long-run effects of one-shot changes in the level with the
long-run effectiveness of changes in the growth rate of money. An initial increase
in the level of M2, coupled with a subsequent reduction in the growth rate, will
reduce inflation over time and avoid perverse impact effects: the perverse impact
effects of the slower growth rate are offset by the beneficial effects of the level
increase. If an increase in the level 'up front' will cause credibility problems with
respect to future cut-backs in M2-growth, one might consider a cut in the time
deposit rate (which would reduce money demand) as an alternative to the level
increase up front.
Here the information on the asset market structure presented in this paper is
important. The financial sector part of the model focuses on the role the curb
market and foreign capital markets play in satisfying the business' sector demand
for financing, on the private sector's portfolio allocation and on the role of the
commercial banks in all this. The role of the curb market is quite persuasive: time
deposits are shown to be a closer substitute to curb market loans than to MI,
indicating that a decrease of time deposit rates would moderate stagflationary
impact effects of low M2 growth rules by increasing the availability of funds to the
business sector as people shift out of time deposits (with high reserve
requirements) to curb market loans (which can be passed on completely, no
required reserves at all). This would lower curb market rates and, via the cost-of-
credit/supply-side line, have a favorable impact effect on inflation.
We also found that the demand equations for M2 components do not show
significant wealth effects, indicating that increased savings are mainly channeled
into the curb market over time. This plus the result that time deposits are closer
substitutes to curb market loans than to MI indicates that the phenomenal
increase in time deposits in 1965 after the financial reform was caused by a switch
from lending at the curb market into time deposits by private asset holders and
not by an increase in savings as is usually claimed.
Further structural information of relevance for policy increases and presented
here is the strong evidence of Korean market power in their export markets.
Domestic cost factors (wages, local currency price of intermediate imports) do
influence Korean competitiveness. Wage changes feed through with a delay only,
while our wage equation shows an incomplete first period adjustment to changes
in the CPI inflation rate, so a devaluation can in fact change relative prices in the
short-run. The importance of intermediate import prices (whose local currency
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value responds one for one to a devaluation) gives this policy instrument a
stagflationary impact effect too however.
A final feature of the financial sector model presented here is that it
incorporates all the accounting identities and balance sheet constraints
constraining the different actors in the economy, and their implications for
behavioral equations. The incorporation of the link between private saving
(determined, loosely speaking, in the real sector) and the increase of end of period
asset stocks (over their beginning of period magnitude) whose allocation is
determined in the financial sector, make the real and financial parts of the model
internally consistent. This seems to be a novelty in applied models, although this
is of course standard in modern theoretical macroeconomics. The model
presented here can generate the national accounts, flow of funds and end of
period asset stocks that are internally consistent with each other and with the
asset stocks carried over from the previous period.
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